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ABSTRACT
The internationalized domain name (IDN) is a mechanism
that enables us to use Unicode characters in domain names.
The set of Unicode characters contains several pairs of charac-
ters that are visually identical with each other; e.g., the Latin
character ‘a’ (U+0061) and Cyrillic character ‘а’ (U+0430).
Visually identical characters such as these are generally
known as homoglyphs. IDN homograph attacks, which are
widely known, abuse Unicode homoglyphs to create looka-
like URLs. Although the threat posed by IDN homograph
attacks is not new, the recent rise of IDN adoption in both
domain name registries and web browsers has resulted in the
threat of these attacks becoming increasingly widespread,
leading to large-scale phishing attacks such as those target-
ing cryptocurrency exchange companies. In this work, we
developed a framework named “ShamFinder,” which is an
automated scheme to detect IDN homographs. Our key con-
tribution is the automatic construction of a homoglyph data-
base, which can be used for direct countermeasures against
the attack and to inform users about the context of an IDN
homograph. Using the ShamFinder framework, we perform
a large-scale measurement study that aims to understand
the IDN homographs that exist in the wild. On the basis of
our approach, we provide insights into an effective counter-
measure against the threats caused by the IDN homograph
attack.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Internationalized domain name (IDN) is a mechanism that al-
lows us to use various non-English characters such as Arabic,
∗The paper is accepted at ACM IMC 2019 (https://conferences.sigcomm.org/
imc/2019/). Please cite the IMC version.
Chinese, Cyrillic, Hangul, Hebrew, Hiragana, or Tamil. IDN
was first proposed by Dürst in 1996 as an Internet Draft (I-
D) [19]. Subsequently, a system known as Internationalizing
Domain Names in Applications (IDNA) was adopted as an
Internet standard [11]. Currently, the IDNA system is widely
deployed in various domains including hundreds of top-level
domains (TLDs). In addition, the majority of modern web
browsers are capable of accommodating IDNs.
Character sets permitted to be used as IDNs contain sev-
eral pairs of characters that are visually similar with each
other. These characters are known as homoglyphs. The exis-
tence of homoglyphs enables an attacker to create a spoofing
domain name. For instance, by using a Unicode character
‘é’, which is a Latin lowercase letter e with an acute accent
(U+00E9), an attacker can create a spoofing domain name,
“facébook.com,” which is visually similar to the original do-
main name “facebook.com.” The domain spoofing attack ex-
ploiting Unicode homoglyphs is known as “IDN homograph
attack” and has been used for malicious purposes such as
phishing attacks. IDN homograph attacks are not a new prob-
lem. In 2002, Gabrilovich and Gontmakher [12] demonstrated
that they successfully registered an IDN homograph using
the two Russian letters ‘с’ and ‘о’.
As the adoption rate of IDN was not high in the past, an
IDN homograph has been recognized as a proof-of-concept
attack. However, the recent rise in the number of IDN regis-
trations and the adoption of an IDN in many TLDs together
with the adoption of IDNs in modern browsers have resulted
in the threat of IDN becoming realistic and has attracted in-
terest from researchers [21, 46] as well as from attackers. In
May 2018, Binance, which is a cryptocurrency exchange com-
pany, reported that their primary domain name binance.com
was the victim of an IDN homograph attack [3]. We note
that as this incident implied, the targets of IDN homograph
attacks are not only browsers, but also email clients, where
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a victim could click a malicious URL composed of an IDN
homograph.
A straightforward and effective countermeasure against
the threat of an IDN homograph attack is to identify possi-
ble IDN homographs. The key technical challenge here is to
automate the process of detecting homoglyphs that could
be abused for creating an IDN homograph. As of May 2019,
of the 137,928 characters included in Unicode 12.0.0 [39],
123,006 characters can be used for IDN, following the speci-
fication of IDNA2008 [8]. Furthermore, the number of IDNs
registered has continued to increase. According to the IDN
World Report [18], the estimated number of IDNs registered
was 2.0 million in 2009 and this number increased to 7.5
million IDNs in December 2017.
In this work, we developed a generic framework named
“ShamFinder,” which aims to identify IDN homographs in a
scalablemanner. The key technical contribution of ShamFinder
is to build a new homoglyph database named SimChar, which
can be maintained without requiring time-consuming man-
ual effort. Unlike previous approaches for detecting IDN
homographs [21, 30], the notable advantage of ShamFinder is
that it can pinpoint the differential characters; thus, it can be
used for direct countermeasures such as building a blacklist
of the confusable characters or highlighting the anomalous
characters to inform the user of the potential risk of an IDN
homograph attack. We note that our homoglyph database
covers a wide range of homoglyphs that have not been listed
in the existing database maintained by the Unicode consor-
tium [36].
Using the ShamFinder framework, we attempt to under-
stand the IDN homographs registered in the wild. In our
study, we investigated the way in which the registered IDN
homographs are abused by collecting IDNs from the world’s
most popular TLD, .com. In addition, using ShamFinder as
a building block, we discuss a proof-of-concept system that
aims to mitigate the threats posed by an IDN homograph
attack.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows:
• We developed a framework named ShamFinder, which
aims to identify IDN homographs in an automated
manner.
• We built a new homoglyph database named SimChar,
which can be automatically updated and can be used
for other security applications such as detecting pla-
giarism that exploits homoglyphs.
• Using the ShamFinder framework, we performed a
large-scale measurement study on how IDNs are used
or abused in the wild. The measurement study demon-
strated that our framework efficiently extracted IDN
homographs, which contained malicious ones.
• Based on the ShamFinder framework, we propose a
practical countermeasure against the generic threat of
IDN homograph attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents an overview of IDN and IDN homograph
attacks. In Section 3, we introduce the ShamFinder frame-
work. Section 4 contains an evaluation of the performance
of the ShamFinder framework from the viewpoints of human
perception and computational costs. In Sections 5 and 6, we
present our data sources and findings derived from the large-
scale measurement of IDN in the wild, using the ShamFinder
framework. Section 7 discusses the limitations of our work
and effective countermeasures against the threats posed by
IDN homograph attacks. In Section 8, we review related work
in comparison with ours. We conclude our work in Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND
This section first presents an overview of IDNs. We then
provide an overview of IDN homograph attacks and recent
studies on the threats posed by these attacks.
2.1 IDN and Permitted Unicode Characters
Since the initial proposal of IDN in 1996, its protocol spec-
ification has been standardized. In 2003, the Internet Cor-
poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and
top IDN registries such as .cn, .info, .jp, .org, and .tw
have published a guideline for the implementation/operation
of IDN [27]． The guideline requires TLD registries to em-
ploy an “inclusion-based” approach, i.e., in each TLD, only
code points that are permitted by the TLD can be used for
IDN. Each TLD employs language-specific registration and
administration rules, which are publicly available as IDN ta-
bles [28]. The tables are maintained by the Internet Assigned
Number Authority (IANA).
This restriction introduced by the inclusion-based ap-
proach is expected to thwart the threats of IDN homograph
attacks because the set of characters that can be used for
IDN are limited with the tables. For instance, the JP domain,
which is the country code top-level domain (ccTLD) for Japan,
limits the permitted character sets for IDN to LDH, which
consists of case-insensitive English letters, digits, and hy-
phens (Letter-Digit-Hypen), Hiragana, Katakana, and a sub-
set of CJK unified ideographs (character set used in Chinese,
Japanese, and Korean). Therefore, it is not possible to register
Latin-based IDN homographs with names such as “ácm.jp”
because the permitted characters for IDN of the JP domain
do not contain a homoglyph of LDH.
However, as we shall present later, among the charac-
ters permitted for each TLD such as .com, there are many
homoglyphs, indicating that an attacker can leverage such
homoglyphs to execute an IDN homograph attack. We note
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that an attacker can create an IDN homograph of a non-Latin
IDN homograph. One of the key contributions of our work is
to automatically build a comprehensive list of homoglyphs,
which could be potentially abused for IDN homograph at-
tack.
Although the IDN extension allows us to use non-Latin
characters for domain names, we need to use LDH at the
protocol level for backward compatibility reasons. Therefore,
we need a mechanism that transcodes a domain name con-
sisting of Unicode characters into one with LDH characters.
In this regard, Punycode is a character encoding scheme for
transcoding a Unicode string to a string with LDH. The spec-
ification of Punycode is defined in RFC 3492 [6]. When using
a string transcoded by Punycode for IDN, we add the prefix
“xn--” to the beginning of the transcoded string. For instance,
the string “阿里巴巴” is represented as “tsta8290bfzd” by
the Punycode transcoding, and the corresponding IDN is
“xn--tsta8290bfzd.com”.
Finally, we note that each web browser implements the
processing of IDN in a different way [23, 35]. As we explain
below, the way IDN is displayed in the address bar could
increase or decrease the threat of an IDN homograph at-
tack. Thus, the implementation largely affects the way users
react to the IDN homograph presented in a browser. In Sec-
tion 7, we discuss a proof-of-concept implementation of IDN
processing on a browser to enable users to become knowl-
edgeable of the existence of a possible IDN homograph attack
without sacrificing the usability of IDN for them.
2.2 IDN Homograph Attack
As mentioned in the previous section, the history of IDN
homograph attacks can be traced back to the early 2000s. As
Gabrilovich and Gontmakher [12] reported in 2002, numer-
ous English domain names can be homographed by leverag-
ing non-Latin letters.
Despite the fact that threats of IDN homograph attacks
were pointed out earlier, effective and usable countermea-
sures against these threats have not been developed. We
conjecture that the reason behind abandoning the threats
is that IDN has not been widely deployed in the world and
there have been few web clients that can correctly process
IDN. However, the situation has changed because popular
web browsers today have developed the ability to handle
IDNs. In addition, according to the IDN World Report [18],
7.5 million of IDNs have been registered by December 2017.
These observations imply that the threat of IDN homograph
attacks have become real. In fact, as mentioned in Section 1,
the cryptocurrency exchange company Binance was the vic-
tim of an IDN homograph attack.
As countermeasures against IDNhomograph attacks, many
browser vendors have updated the implementation of dis-
playing IDN in the address bar after the threat of an IDN
homolog attack was widely publicized by a blog post on the
web [46] in April 2017. Specifically, Firefox and Chrome have
changed their implementations as follows: when characters
originating frommultiple scripts (character sets) are mixed in
a character string constituting an IDN, the IDN is displayed
in the form of Punycode instead of Unicode [23, 35]. For in-
stance, if a Latin-script-based domain name comprises non-
English scripts such as Latin scripts, Cyrillic scripts, or Greek
scripts, the domain name is displayed in the form of Puny-
code; i.e., for “facébook”, its Punycode, xn--facbook-dya is
displayed in the address bar.
Although this update can be expected to mitigate the
threats of IDN homographs to some extent, it is likely to im-
pair the usability because Punycode is not a human-friendly
representation. As the human-readable domain name pro-
vides hints as to the authenticity of the website, masking
the original domain name may leave users less knowledge-
able. Although the aforementioned countermeasure by the
browsers becomes a temporary countermeasure against IDN
homograph attacks, if it is compulsorily displayed in Puny-
code, it is problematic in that it becomes difficult to under-
stand the cause of the threat. That is, because the user does
not notice that the domain name entered in the browser is a
homograph attack, the user risks visiting the site with the
same domain name again.
We also note that, in the above implementations, even in
the case of an IDN composed of multiple scripts, if the do-
main name comprises both Latin script and a CJK ideograph,
it will be displayed with Unicode. Furthermore, an attacker
can create an IDN by not only combining Latin script, Cyril-
lic script, or Greek script but also by combining characters
belonging to the set of CJK ideographs. We refer to such
a homograph as a non-Latin homograph. For instance, the
string “工業大学” (meaning an institute of technology in
English) has the homograph, “エ業大学”, where ‘工’ is a
CJK Unified Ideograph (U+5DE5) and ‘エ’ is a Katakana Let-
ter (U+30A8). Current web browsers do not have a way to
identify non-Latin IDN homographs such as this.
3 SHAMFINDER FRAMEWORK
In this section, we first provide a high-level overview of the
ShamFinder framework. Next, we present several Unicode
character sets and those used for IDN. We note that precise
understanding of these character sets is essential in extract-
ing Unicode homoglyphs that could be abused for an IDN
homograph attack. We then describe the approach we fol-
lowed to build the homoglyph database, which plays a key
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Figure 1: Overview of the ShamFinder Framework.
role in the ShamFinder framework. Finally, we describe the
characteristics of the homoglyph database.
3.1 High-level Overview
Figure 1 presents a high-level overview of the ShamFinder
framework.
Step 1: First, we collect registered/active domain names for
each TLD. To this end, we can either make use of the DNS
zone file for each TLD or publicly available/commercial do-
main name lists such as [7]. We introduce the datasets we
used for our analysis in Section 5.
Step 2: Next, we extract IDNs from the collected domain
names by searching for those starting with the prefix “xn--.”
Step 3: To find IDN homographs, we leverage a list of popu-
lar domain names as reference. As representative reference
we can leverage a website ranking lists [29, 31] such as Alexa
Top Sites [2] or Majestic Million [22]. Next, we leverage the
database of homoglyphs to identify potential IDN homo-
graphs; as we show in the next subsection, our contribution
is to present a way of automatically building such a database.
Figure 2 and Algorithm 1 show the IDN detection scheme.
We check the length (number of characters) of each domain
name listed in the reference domain names list and extract
the IDNs with the same number of characters. For each pair
consisting of a reference domain name and sampled IDN, we
check their letters one by one to determine whether they
correspond. If two corresponding letters match each other,
we proceed to the next pair of letters. If the letters do not
match, we check whether the pair is listed in the homoglyph
database, which we present in the next subsection. If they
are listed, we proceed to the next pair of letters and repeat
the same process. If we find letters that do not match, we
conclude that the IDN is not an IDN homograph of the ref-
erence domain name. The computational complexity of the
algorithm is |N | |M | |L| where |N |, |M |, and L are the number
of reference websites, number of IDNs, and number of char-
acters contained in a domain name, respectively. Although
this is a naïve approach, the actual calculation cost has been
reduced by restricting the computation of matching to those
Homoglyph DB
g o o g l e
g օ օ g l e
g o o g l e
g o c aié
o օ
Match?
reference
IDN
reference
IDN
,
U+0585U+006F
Match? ⇒ skip the rest
Homoglyph DB
Latin ArmenianUC SimChar UC SimChar
Figure 2: IDNhomograph detection scheme for a given
TLD. Left: a domain name is detected as an IDN homo-
graph. Right: a domain name is not detected as an IDN
homograph. In this example, the TLD part has been re-
moved.
Algorithm 1 Homograph detection algorithm
Ω ⇐ A set of IDNs for a given TLD (TLD part removed)
R ⇐ A set of reference domain names for a given TLD (TLD part re-
moved)
▷ len(x ) returns the length of a string x .　
▷ x [i] represents the i-th character of string x .
for r ∈ R do　
Let ω ⊂ Ω be a set s.t. len(r ) = len(x ) ∀x ∈ ω
for x ∈ ω do
for i = 1; i ≤ len(x ); i → i + 1 do
if r [i] = x [i] then next
else if r [i] and x [i] are listed as a pair in the SimChar data-
base then next
else
Mark x as not being a homograph of r and skip the loops
for the next x
Mark x as a homograph of r
　
pairs of strings with the same length. The evaluation of the
time needed for the computation appears in Section 4.
3.2 Unicode Characters Sets and IDN
Our primary goal is to compile a database that lists pairs of
visually identical Unicode characters (homoglyphs) that are
permitted to be used for IDN. We explain how we compile
this database by beginning with a description of several Uni-
code character sets. Figure 3 summarizes the contamination
and overlap of the Unicode character sets. The root set is the
characters contained in Unicode 12.0.0 [39]. The set contains
a total of 137,928 characters, covering 150 scripts, includ-
ing modern/historic characters, signs, and symbols such as
Emoticons. Of the character sets defined in Unicode 12.0, the
latest set of characters permitted for the use in IDN is defined
in the Internet draft, named draft-faltstrom-unicode12-00
(“IDNA2008 and Unicode 12.0.0”) [8]. The number of Uni-
code characters contained in the IDNA2008 draft is 123,006;
these characters are listed in the section, “Code points in
Unicode Character Database (UCD),” of the draft with the
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Unicode 12.0.0
UC
IDNA2008 draft SimChar
Figure 3: Contamination and overlap of character sets.
UC denotes the recommended confusable mapping
for IDN, “confusables.txt.”
Table 1: Number of characters contained in each set
shown in Figure 3; IDNA2008 draft (IDNA), Unicode
confusables.txt (UC), and SimChar.
Sets # characters # homoglyph pairs
IDNA 123,006 n/a
UC 9,605 6,296
UC ∩ IDNA 980 627
SimChar 12,686 13,208
SimChar ∩ UC 233 127
SimChar ∪ (UC ∩ IDNA) 13,210 13,708
property of “PROTOCOL VALID (PVALID),” which indicates
that the code points with the property value are permitted
for general use in IDNs [10].
In the document named Unicode Technical Standard #39
(UNICODE SECURITY MECHANISMS), a database named
“confusables.txt” is provided. This text file compiles the con-
fusable mapping for IDN. In this work, we refer to the data-
base as UC for brevity. The UC database lists visually con-
fusable characters and provides a mapping for visual confus-
ables for use in detecting security problems such as an IDN
homograph attack. Although UC covers a wide range of ho-
moglyphs that could be abused for IDN homograph attacks,
our empirical observations revealed that a non-negligible
number of homoglyphs are not contained in UC as shown
in Table 1. This observation motivated us to build a new
homoglyph database, SimChar, which is described in the
next subsection. We note that although UC has been man-
ually maintained, we can build SimChar in an automated
way, implying that it can discover new homoglyphs from
newly registered Unicode characters in future. Furthermore,
as explained in Section 4, homoglyphs contained in SimChar
are more confusing than those contained in UC.
We note that UC covers several characters that are not
contained in the IDNA2008 draft. Of the characters defined
UC
IDNA2008 draft
SimCharFont set
(Unifont12)
Figure 4: Contamination and overlap of character sets.
in the IDNA2008 draft, 980 characters are listed in UC; i.e.,
these 980 characters are potentially abused for IDN homo-
graph attacks. Our contribution is to build a complementary
database named SimChar, which is compiled of a set of char-
acters that have at least one homoglyph character from the
IDNA2008 draft character set. The new set has 13,210 char-
acters that are also included in UC. It adds 3,605 characters
that have not been listed in UC. Moreover, as seen in Table 3,
SimChar adds 316 homoglyphs of Basic Latin characters that
are not listed in UC. Table 1 summarizes the number of char-
acters contained in the character sets shown in Figure 3. We
note that the ShamFinder framework makes use of the union
of two sets UC and SimChar to find IDN homographs. We
also note that a character could be the homoglyph of several
other characters. We count such pairs as “Homoglyph pairs.”
Homoglyphs contained in SimChar are built from a set of
characters contained in IDNA. We notice that although the
number of characters contained in UC is roughly 10K, if
we consider the number of IDNA-permitted characters, the
size becomes much smaller by a factor of 10. The details of
SimChar will be shown later.
3.3 Building Homoglyph Database
As shown in Fig. 2, we use UC and SimChar as the compo-
nents of the homoglyph database we used to detect IDN ho-
mographs. The key idea of SimChar is to extract homoglyphs
by computing the similarity between the glyphs of corre-
sponding characters. We first need to represent each code
point as a visual image (glyph). To this end, we can make use
of various Unicode fonts such as those listed in [38]. In this
work, we adopt GNU Unifont Glyphs [40], which covers the
entire collection of characters contained in the Unicode Basic
Multilingual Plane (BMP) as well as several other characters
of the Supplemental Multilingual Plane (SMP). Although
BMP contains characters for almost all modern languages
and a large number of symbols, SMP contains historic char-
acters and signs as well as the symbols used in various fields
such as Emoticons. Even though the choice of a font may
affect the detected homoglyphs, the following procedure can
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Table 2: Number of characters contained in the Uni-
font12 font set (Figure 4).
Sets # Chars # Pairs
IDNA ∩ Unifont12 52,457 n/a
UC ∩ Unifont12 5,080 3,696
SimChar ∩ Unifont121 12,686 13,208
easily be extended to other font sets. We aim to evaluate
other fonts in future work.
Figure 4 presents the relationship between the character
sets. Of the characters contained in the IDNA2008 draft,
the latest version of Unifont (Unifont12 for short) covers
52,457 characters. Several IDN-permitted characters are not
covered by Unifont12. However, as Unifont provides much
larger coverage than other proprietary Unicode fonts such
as Microsoft JhengHei, we deem the choice to be reasonable.
In fact, of the 2,990 IDN-permitted characters in UC, 2,877
characters are covered by Unifont12. Table 2 summarizes the
number of characters contained in the character sets shown
in Figure 4. In the following, we denote UC and SimChar as
those with the union sets of Unifont12 for brevity.
Next, we attempt to identify homoglyphs by testing their
similarity as images. The structural similarity index measure
(SSIM) is a widely used metric to quantify the degradation
of image quality caused by processing methods such as data
compression or by losses in data transmission [16, 45]. Thus,
it can also quantify the similarity between a pair of images.
However, because our objective is not assessing the percep-
tual metric that quantifies image quality degradation, we
directly count the number of different pixels between two
images. Let I (i, j) ∈ {0, 1} (0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1)
be a square image having N × N pixels, where each pixel is
represented as a binary digit. Our metric, ∆ is computed as
∆ =
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
|I1(i, j) − I2(i, j)| .
When ∆ = 0, it indicates that two images are completely
identical.
We note that ∆ can be associated with the peak signal-
to-noise ratio (PSNR), which is another widely used metric
aimed at quantifying the reproducibility of images [16, 45].
In our model, I (i, j) is represented as a binary bit. Therefore,
the mean square error (MSE) is computed as
MSE =
1
N 2
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
{I1(i, j) − I2(i, j)}2 = ∆
N 2
.
1Note that SimChar is composed using the union set of IDNA and Unifont12.
Therefore, |SimChar | = | SimChar ∩Unifont12 |.
U+0079U+10e7 U+0062U+0253 U+0061U+0430
U+91cc U+573c U+bfc8 U+bf58 U+0b32U+0b33
Figure 5: Examples of Unifont glyph images of Uni-
code characters. Top: Basic Latin characters and
their homoglyphs. Bottom: CJK Unified Ideographs,
Hangul syllables, and Oriya (Indo-Aryan language
spoken in the Indian state of Odisha), and their homo-
glyphs.
Using the MSE, the PSNR is computed as
PSNR = 10 log10
(
1
MSE
)
= 20 log10 N − 10 log10 ∆.
In the following, we show the processes we employed to
construct the SimChar database.
Step I For the 52,457 characters in the intersection of
the IDNA2008 draft and Unifont12, we represent the
characters as bitmap images of 32×32 pixels, using the
Unifont glyphs. Note that the original size of Unifont11
is 8× 8 pixels for Latin characters and 16× 16 for other
characters. Figure 5 presents the example of the gen-
erated Unifont glyph images where we intentionally
chose visually similar pairs.
Step II For all the pairs in the pairwise combinations of
the 52,457 characters, we compute the metric ∆. If ∆
is less than or equal to a threshold θ , the two char-
acters are identified as homoglyphs. In this work, we
empirically derived a conservative threshold as θ = 4;
i.e., a pair of characters are detected as homoglyphs if
∆ ≤ 4. Figure 6 shows examples of Unicode characters
with various values of ∆. Although ∆ = 4 would not
indicate obvious false positives (i.e., those that should
not be detected as homoglyphs), we can observe sev-
eral false negatives (i.e., those that could be detected
as homoglyphs) among characters with ∆ ≥ 5. In Sec-
tion 4, we consider an evaluation of the validity of the
threshold by presenting a human study.
Step III Finally, from the extracted pairs, we eliminate
sparse characters that contain fewer than 10 black pix-
els. The threshold was empirically derived as a result
of careful manual effort. In most cases, these charac-
ters are used for punctuation, spacing/nonspacing, or
combining in various languages. Figure 7 presents ex-
amples of the eliminated characters.
After performing the four processes described above, we
obtained a set of 12,636 characters. The set constitutes 13,126
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∆ = 0 ∆ = 1 ∆ = 2 ∆ = 3 ∆ = 4 ∆ = 5 ∆ = 6
Figure 6: Basic Latin lowercase letter ‘e’ and characters under different values of the threshold ∆. In this work,
characters with ∆ ≤ 4 are detected as homoglyphs.
U+1be7 U+2df5 U+a953 U+abec
Figure 7: Examples of sparse characters.
Table 3: Number of homoglyphs of Latin letters (low-
ercase) contained in SimChar and UC ∩ IDNA.
SimChar
# # #
‘o’ 40 ‘s’ 14 ‘f’ 8
‘e’ 26 ‘r’ 14 ‘m’ 8
‘n’ 24 ‘a’ 14 ‘g’ 7
‘w’ 20 ‘k’ 13 ‘j’ 7
‘c’ 19 ‘t’ 13 ‘p’ 7
‘l’ 18 ‘z’ 12 ‘x’ 6
‘u’ 18 ‘d’ 10 ‘q’ 2
‘h’ 17 ‘y’ 9 ‘v’ 1
‘i’ 16 ‘b’ 8
Total 351
UC ∩ IDNA
# # #
‘o’ 34 ‘c’ 4 ‘p’ 3
‘l’ 12 ‘d’ 4 ‘x’ 3
‘y’ 10 ‘g’ 4 ‘j’ 2
‘i’ 9 ‘f’ 4 ‘n’ 2
‘u’ 9 ‘a’ 3 ‘z’ 2
‘w’ 8 ‘b’ 3
‘v’ 6 ‘e’ 3
‘s’ 5 ‘h’ 3
‘r’ 5 ‘q’ 3
Total 141
pairs, which we named SimChar. As shown in Table 1, the
size of the intersection of SimChar and UC is fairly small,
indicating that SimChar successfully adds new homoglyphs
that have not been covered by UC. We also note that there
are several characters that are not covered by SimChar, but
are covered by UC. Thus, the two character sets can be used
complementary to identify potential IDN homograph attacks.
3.4 Characteristics of SimChar
Homoglyphs of Latin Letters As the majority of popular
websites make use of the 26 Latin letters to construct their
primary domain names, it is essential to study the extent to
which our homoglyph database covers the homoglyphs of
Latin letters. Table 3 lists the results. We first notice that Sim-
Char successfully extracted new homoglyphs that have not
been contained in UC. For instance, whereas the intersection
of IDNA2008 and UC contains only three homoglyphs for the
Basic Latin lowercase letter ‘e’, SimChar contains 26 homo-
glyphs of ‘e’ as shown in Figure 6. We also notice that several
characters have many homoglyphs. In total, SimChar con-
tains 351 homoglyphs of Latin letters, whereas UC contains
141 of these homoglyphs. In the SimChar dataset, the Basic
Latin lowercase letter ‘o’ has 40 characters that are visually
similar to it, indicating that the character is “vulnerable” to
an IDN homograph attack. We note that the intersection of
the sets of homoglyphs for ‘o’ for SimChar and UC contains
5 characters, implying that they cover different sets of ho-
moglyphs of ‘o’; i.e., the majority of homoglyphs of ‘o’ listed
in SimChar were accented characters of ‘o’, whereas the ma-
jority of homoglyphs of ‘o’ listed in UC were characters of
which the appearance resembles a circle.
Unicode Blocks In Unicode, a block is a contiguous range
of code points. A block consists of hundreds to tens of thou-
sands of characters. The characters contained in a block are
typically associated with the writing systems in which the
characters are used; e.g., the Basic Latin block consists of all
the characters and control codes of the ASCII character set.
The majority of the blocks are classified into two planes: the
Basic Multilingual Plane (BMP) and Supplementary Multi-
lingual Plane (SMP). In the BMP, the largest block is the CJK
Unified Ideograph, the characters of which are used in the
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean languages, and it contains
more than 20 K of Chinese characters.
Table 4 compares UC and SimChar with respect to their
top-5 blocks. Although the two scripts, CJKUnified Ideographs
and Arabic are commonly found, the breakdown of these
scripts differ from each other, indicating that the coverage of
UC and SimChar is different. Our contribution is to automat-
ically build SimChar, which can complement the manually
compiled list of homoglyphs, i.e., UC. We note that the .com
TLD is allowed to use characters from either of these blocks
for IDN.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents our evaluation of the performance of
the ShamFinder framework from the viewpoints of (1) human
perception and (2) computational cost.
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Table 4: Top-5 Unicode blocks contained in SimChar
(left) and UC ∩ IDNA (right). CJK, CDM, Hangul, and
CA are abbreviations of the CJK Unified Ideographs,
Combining Diacritical Marks, Hangul Syllables, and
Unified Canadian Aboriginal Syllabics, respectively.
SimChar
Block #chars
Hangul 8,787
CJK 395
CA 387
Vai 134
Arabic 107
UC ∩ IDNA
Block #chars
CJK 91
CDM 56
Arabic 52
Cyrillic 40
Thai 36
4.1 Human Perception
We evaluated the human perception of the homoglyphs
listed in our SimChar database; i.e., to determine whether
humans perceive their homoglyphs as confusing. To this end,
we employed a series of human study experiments using a
crowd sourcing platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk
in short). We designed two types of experiments. In our first
experiment, we studied the effect of the threshold ∆, which
was introduced in Section 3.2, on the extent to which Sim-
Char homoglyphs could be confused, i.e., their “confusability.”
This experiment is intended to demonstrate the validity of
the threshold we determined for detecting homoglyphs, i.e.,
∆ = 4. Next, we compare the confusability of SimChar and
UC, with the baseline of random pairs of characters.
Experimental SetupWe created a crowd sourcing task that
asks a participant whether pairs of two characters, which
may contain homoglyphs, are confusing or distinct. Before
performing the large-scale experiment, we carefully designed
our experiment by conducting a series of pilot study trials
that enabled us to adjust the wording of questions and an-
swers. Several trials of the pilot study allowed us to obtain
useful feedback from coworkers and participants, and we
ultimately worded the question as “There are two characters
shown in the image. Are they distinct or confusing?.” In terms
of the answer, the following words were selected as the op-
tions for the five-level Likert scale score, “1: very distinct,” “2:
distinct,” “3: neutral,” “4: confusing,” and “5: very confusing.” In
this work, we refer to this score as the “confusability score.”
Figure 8 presents a screenshot of an assignment in the task
presented to participants. The purpose of the assignment
was to judge whether two characters contained in an image
are distinct or confusing. Before conducting crowd sourcing
experiments, we measured the average time to finish an
assignment by ourselves and found an assignment to require
approximately 15 seconds to complete, including the time
to select an answer, submit it via the web interface, and
wait for the page transition to the next assignment. On the
Figure 8: Screenshot of the MTurk task.
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Figure 9: Boxplot of the confusability scores for pairs
of SimChar homoglyphs for different values of the
threshold, ∆. The notch in each box represents theme-
dian and the dashed lines represent the mean values.
Whiskers represent 1.5 IQR.
basis of this observation, we set the reward per assignment
as 0.05 USD, implying that the reward is equivalent to an
average hourly compensation of 12 USD. As the minimum
wage in the USA is in the range of 7–12 USD / hour [41] (as
of March 2019), we believe our payment configuration was
appropriate, i.e., it was neither too low nor too high.
To ensure the quality of experiments, we used the follow-
ing two criteria when recruiting participants: (1) the number
of approved tasks of a participant should exceed 50 and (2)
the participant should have a task approval rate greater than
97%.
To check whether a participant was careful when com-
pleting the task, we inserted dummy images that contain
two completely distinct random characters. A participant
who judged a dummy image as being either “4: confusing”
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or “5: very confusing” had all their responses removed, as-
suming that the reliability of the participant was low. We
likewise removed all the responses from participants who
answered “1: very distinct” or “2: distinct” to a homoglyph
contained in SimChar with the threshold of ∆ = 0, i.e., when
the glyphs of the two characters were perfectly identical
with the font we used (GNU Unifont). Although this strategy
may have aggressively removed the useful responses by a
participant who accidentally made a single mistake, we de-
cided to overcome the drawback by simply increasing the
number of responses/samples.
Experiment 1: Threshold of SimChar We first studied
the way in which the threshold, ∆, affects human perception.
In this experiment, we used homoglyphs of the Basic Latin
letters (lowercase), the numbers of which are listed in Table 3.
For each letter, we extracted the glyphs with a distance of
∆ ∈ {0, . . . , 8}. For each ∆, we randomly sampled 20 pairs,
where a pair consists of a letter and its potential homoglyph
detected with the threshold ∆. In addition, we added 30 of
dummy pairs that contain two distinct letters randomly gen-
erated. These 20 × 9 = 180 pairs of potential homoglyphs
and 30 random pairs were judged by 10 participants (after
the removal of unreliable participants). In total, we obtained
900 effective responses for the 180 pairs.
Figure 9 presents the result. As expected, the confusabil-
ity score decreases as the threshold increases. When ∆ = 4,
the mean and median of the confusability score were 3.57
and 4, respectively. This observation implies that the homo-
glyphs detected with the threshold were mostly perceived as
“confusing.” When ∆ = 5, the mean and median of the con-
fusability score were 2.57 and 2, respectively, implying that
the detected homoglyphs were mostly perceived as “distinct.”
On the basis of these observations, we adopted ∆ = 4 as the
threshold for extracting homoglyphs; i.e., glyphs with ∆ ≤ 4
were detected as homoglyphs. Although several pairs with
the threshold of ∆ = 5 had a high confusability score, we
adopted a conservative decision. Extracting further confus-
able homoglyphs from these potential homoglyphs remains
as a future task.
Experiment 2: Confusability of UC and SimChar. Next,
we studied the confusability of UC in comparison with Sim-
Char for whichwe repeated the same procedure shown above.
We sampled 30 of the homoglyphs of the Basic Latin letters
(lowercase) listed in UC. These 30 pairs were judged by 28
participants (after the removal of unreliable participants). In
total, we obtained 513 effective responses for the 30 pairs
sampled from UC. For SimChar, we compiled 486 effective
responses for the 20 × 5 = 100 pairs of homoglyphs detected
with ∆ ≤ 4.
Figure 10 shows the result. For comparison, 513 of the
effective responses for the 30 dummy pairs (Random) are
also plotted. Although the confusable scores of the random
Random SimChar UC
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Figure 10: Boxplot of the confusability score for the
pairs of three sets: Random (left), SimChar (middle),
and UC (right). The threshold of SimChar was set to
∆ ≤ 4. The boxplot configuration is the same as in Fig-
ure 10.
U+0075 U+118D8 U+0079 U+028F U+0079 U+118DC
Figure 11: Three pairs of homoglyphs listed in UC.
They were most frequently judged as “very distinct”
by the participants. They are homoglyphs of ‘u’ (left),
‘y’ (middle), and ‘y’ (right), respectively.
pairs were mostly concentrated near the lowest option (“very
distinct”), for both SimChar and UC, the median of the con-
fusable score was 4, i.e., the homoglyphs of both databases
were perceived as “confusing” on average. Note that the aver-
age confusable score for SimChar was larger than 4, whereas
that for UC was smaller than 4, implying that the homo-
glyphs contained in SimChar were more confusable than
those contained in UC.
Figure 11 presents three examples of UC pairs that at-
tracted the lowest confusability score. As these examples
imply, several homoglyphs listed in UC have glyphs that
could be perceived as distinct from the original letter, al-
though some of the pairs could be semantically close. On
the other hand, the homoglyphs listed in SimChar should
have small differences by definition. These results led us to
conclude that the homoglyphs listed in SimChar are actually
perceived as confusable.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Hiroaki Suzuki, Daiki Chiba, Yoshiro Yoneya, Tatsuya Mori, and Shigeki Goto
Table 5: Time taken for constructing SimChar.
Process Time
Generating images 79.2 seconds
Computing ∆ for all the pairs 10.9 hours
Eliminating sparse characters 18.0 seconds
4.2 Computation Cost of the ShamFinder
Framework
We first measured the time taken for constructing SimChar.
Table 5 summarizes the results. As expected, the time for com-
puting ∆ for the pairwise combination of 52,457 characters,
which is provided in Table 2, was the most time-consuming
step of the computation. For this computation, we used a
multi-processing approach with the number of concurrent
processes set to 15. We used an off-the-shelf server with an
Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 v2 (2.10 GHz) and 62 GB memory.
In practice, we would need to update SimChar when the
Unicode standard adds a new set of glyphs or we incorporate
a new set of fonts to be analyzed. That is, the frequency of
updating SimChar should be reasonably low; e.g., Unicode
version 12.0 was released one year after the release of version
11.0. The new version added 553 characters to those in the
previous one.
Next, wemeasured the time to extract IDN homographs us-
ing the ShamFinder framework. To extract IDN homographs
of the Alexa top-10k domains from the 141M of .com TLD do-
main names (see Table 6 for reference) required 743.6 seconds,
i.e., on average, each reference domain name was inspected
in 0.07(= 743.6/10, 000) seconds, which is sufficiently fast to
block a suspicious, newly found IDN homograph attack in
real time.
5 DATA SOURCES
In this section, we describe the data sources used for our
analysis of IDN homographs.
5.1 Reference Domain Names
The aim of an IDN homograph attack is to attract a victim
to a malicious website by using a homograph that is visually
identical to the domain name of a legitimate website. As
such, the natural assumption is that an attacker creates an
IDN homograph of a domain name used for a popular web-
site. In fact, other deception techniques such as “typosquat-
ting” or “brandjacking” also target widely recognized domain
names [1, 34]. As a reference of well-known popular domain
names, we adopted Alexa Top Sites [2]; namely, we extracted
the top-10K of .com domains from the Alexa ranking list.
Table 6: Summary of domain name lists and the num-
ber of IDNs they contained.
Data Number of Number of Collection
domain names IDNs time
zone file [42] 140,900,279 952,352 (0.67%) May 2019
domainlists.io [7] 139,667,014 953,209 (0.73%) May 2019
Total (union) 141,212,035 955,512 (0.67%) –
5.2 Extracting IDNs
Although many domain name spaces are available in the
Internet, in this study, we focused on domain names un-
der the .com TLD for the following three reasons. First, the
majority of popular websites are attributed to this TLD. As
the word “dot-com bubble” symbolizes, .com has become
the most popular TLD since the early 2000s. Although .com
was originally intended for commercial usage, it eventually
became available for general purposes. Second, as shown
below, the majority of malicious IDNs are also attributed
to this TLD. Finally, as .com TLD is globally popular, it per-
mits a large number of Unicode blocks to be used for IDNs.
According to IANA’s IDN tables [28], under the .com TLD,
characters across 97 different Unicode blocks can be used for
IDNs as of May 2019. This fact implies that for .com TLD,
an attacker can register an IDN homograph that contains
homoglyphs sampled from various Unicode blocks.
To search for IDN homographs, we first needed to extract
registered IDNs. To this end, we used the DNS zone file main-
tained by the registries of the .com TLD — Verisign [42]. The
DNS zone file lists all the registered domain names with their
NS records. We complemented the zone file by using another
list of domain names named domainlists.io [7]. The union
set of the two lists contains 141.2 M of unique domain names.
As mentioned above, we can extract IDNs by searching for
domain names starting with the prefix “xn--”.
Table 6 summarizes the number of domain names/IDNs
for each dataset. We first notice that a non-negligible number
of IDNs are currently registered in the .com TLD, implying
the widespread adoption of IDN in the wild. Next, we exam-
ined the languages used in those IDNs to understand which
Unicode blocks are widely used in the IDNs. To detect the
language used in a string, we leveraged a tool known as
LangID [20], which is a Python module that can detect the
most plausible language out of 97 distinct languages for a
given string. Table 7 presents the results. We see that east
Asian languages (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean) are domi-
nantly used for composing IDNs wheres several European
languages are also popular for this purpose. This observation
implies that the demand for the use of native languages is
ubiquitous.
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Table 7: Top languages used for IDNs.
Rank Language Number Fraction (%)
1 Chinese 443,865 46.5
2 Korean 101,711 10.6
3 Japanese 88,970 9.3
4 Germany 53,776 5.6
5 Turkish 35,288 3.6
Table 8: Number of detected IDN homographs for
ASCII domains.
Homoglyph DB Number
UC 436
SimChar 3,110
UC ∪ SimChar 3,280
6 DETECTING IDN HOMOGRAPHSWITH
THE SHAMFINDER FRAMEWORK.
In this section, we apply the ShamFinder framework to the
data we described in the previous sections. We first studied
the IDN homographs that targeted popular domain names
that reside in the .com TLD. We then studied the malicious
IDN homographs detected by our approach. In comparison to
the existing approach, we compared the number of detected
malicious IDN homographs by changing the homoglyph
database. As discussed in Section 8, the previous approach to
detecting IDN homographs proposed by Quinkert et al. [26]
leveraged UC as their homoglyph database. That is, we can
directly compare the IDN homograph detection performance
between their approach (UC only) and ours (UC and Sim-
Char).
6.1 Statistics of the IDN Homographs
Table 8 presents the number of detected IDN homographs
targeting ASCII-character domain names. When we used UC,
the ShamFinder framework detected 436 IDN homographs
out of the 955 K IDNs registered in the .com TLD. On the
other hand, when we used SimChar, more than 3,110 of IDN
homographs were detected. In total, by using both homo-
glyph databases, we detected 3,280 IDN homographs, which
is approximately eight times more than those detected with
UC. Thus, the adoption of SimChar as the homoglyph data-
base enables us to detect more IDN homographs than existing
approaches such as that of Quinkert [26].
Table 9 presents the the top-5 domain names that have the
most IDN homographs. Three of these domains, google.com,
amazon.com, and facebook.com are all popular domains;
however, the two other domains, myetherwallet.com and all-
state.com are not that popular compared to the other three
Table 9: Top-5ASCII domainnames that have themost
IDN homographs.
Rank Domain name # homographs
1 myetherwallet.com 170
2 google.com 114
3 amazon.com 75
4 facebook.com 72
5 allstate.com 68
Table 10: Port scan results for the detected IDN homo-
graphs.
Ports # domain names
TCP/80 1,642
TCP/443 700
TCP/80 & TCP/443 695
Total (unique) 1,647
domains. In fact, the first three domains are ranked among
the top-10 domains in the Alexa ranking, whereas the other
two domains are ranked 7,400th and 5,148th among the .com
TLD domains in the Alexa ranking, respectively. This obser-
vation demonstrates that IDN homograph attacks not only
target very popular websites, they also target other moder-
ately popular websites, implying that starting with a small
list of reference domains may not be effective for IDN ho-
mographs that target minor domains. We discuss this issue
below (Section 6.4).
In the following, we analyze the IDNs that are currently
active. First, we checked the NS records for the 3,280 ho-
mograph IDNs we detected. We found 2,294 domain names
with NS records, while other domain names did not have
NS records due to some reasons such as expiration, non-
registration, etc. Of the 2,294 domain names, 385 domain
names did not have A records. For the remaining 1,909 do-
main names, we performed port scans to the ports TCP/80
and TCP/443. Table 10 shows the results. We found that the
1,647 IDN homographs we detected were reachable through
the HTTP or HTTPS; i.e., roughly half of the detected IDN
homographs were active.
6.2 Deep Inspection of the Active IDN
Homographs
In this section, we further inspect the characteristics of the
active IDN homographs we found in the previous subsection.
In the following, we show the analyses from two aspects: (1)
analysis of the popular IDN homographs and (2) classification
of IDN homographs.
(1) Analysis of the popular IDN homographs
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To study how the active IDN homographs have been accessed
by end users, we focus on the “popular” IDN homographs
that likely attracted large number of end-users. To this end,
we performed the analysis using the passive DNS [9], which
is a DNS monitoring system that is composed of several
working DNS cache servers. A passive DNS system provides
useful statistics such as the number of cumulative name
resolutions for each domain name. We note that the statistics
provided by a passive DNS system reflects sampled data
collected at a set of cache servers contributing to the system.
Therefore, the actual numbers of DNS lookups over the entire
Internet should be much larger than those obtained from
a passive DNS system. We also note that the number of
web accesses and number of DNS resolutions are different.
However, we believe that the number of DNS resolutions is
correlated with the popularity of a domain name, given that
every first web query should be preceded by a DNS query.
Table 11 shows the top-10 domain names that had the
largest numbers of DNS lookups. We studied the categories
of the websites running on the IDNs by manual inspection.
We found that of the top-10 IDNs, four of them targeted
gmail.com. In particular, the top IDN, gmaıl[.]com was
an active phishing site and had a large number of name
resolutions, implying that there have been a large number of
end-users who accessed the phishingwebsite2. We found that
the website under the IDN employed a cloaking technique
to redirect a visitor to the different websites according to
the User-agent of the visitor’s browser. We also found that
the majority of the IDNs were parked domains; these were
used for monetizing through advertisements and/or were
reserved for resale.
In Table 11, the columns “MX,” “Web link,” and “SNS” repre-
sent, whether there was a generic website linking to the IDN
homograph, and whether there was a web link pointing to
the IDN homograph on popular SNS websites such as Twitter.
We used the search engines for the latter two analyses. We
found that the IDN homographs that target domain names
used for email services such as gmail.com and yahoo.com
have MX records either in the past or in the present. We also
saw that several IDN homographs have appeared in public
webspace, including SNS. These observations imply that the
owners of these IDN homographs have attempted to make
the IDN homographs publicly visible.
(2) Classification of IDN homographs
We now attempt to classify the 1,647 active IDN homo-
graphs that responded to either TCP/80 or TCP/443. To this
end, we make use of a list of NS records for the domain
2As of September 2019, this website was still in operation. We have reported
about the website to the security vendors.
Table 11: Top-10 active IDNs that had the largest num-
bers of DNS resolutions. indicates that there is an ac-
tive MX record registered.G#indicates that there was a
MX record in the past.
Domain name Category #resolutions MX Web link SNS
gmaıl[.]com Phishing 615,447 G#
döviz[.]com Portal 127,417  
‘gmail[.]com Parked 74,699 G#
gmàil[.]com Parked 63,233  
expansión[.]com Parked 56,918 G#  
gmaiĺ[.]com Parked 49,248  
yàhoo[.]com Parked 44,368 G#
shädbase[.]com Parked 38,556  
youtubê[.]com Sale 37,713  
perú[.]com Parked 36,405  
parking companies, screenshots of the websites, and Virus-
Total [43], which is an online virus scanner. To compile a list
NS records for the domain parking companies, we leverage
the list and methods proposed in [4, 44]. We added several
NS records and ended up 17 of NS records used for domain
parking.
Next, for the remaining IDN homographs that were not at-
tributed to domain parking, we accessed to the corresponding
websites via the two schemes, HTTP and HTTPS, and took
screenshots using the puppeteer [25], which is a headless
browser that provides APIs to control Chrome or Chromium.
Based on the characteristics of screenshots and HTTP re-
sponses, we classified the websites into the following five
categories: “For sale,” “Redirect,”, “Normal,”, “Empty,” and
“Error,” which represent a website that encourages you to
buy the domain, a website that redirects to another website,
a website that displays something legitimate successfully, a
website that displays nothing, and a website that failed to get
a screenshot due to a timeout or other reasons, respectively.
Table 12 shows the results. We found that 693 (42%) of the
websites running on IDN homographs were used for busi-
ness (“Domain parking” or “For sale”). We also found that
338 (21%) of the websites running on IDN homographs were
redirected to other websites having different domain names.
We further analyzed these 338 websites using VirusTotal and
manual inspection of the screenshots. Table 13 shows the
breakdown of the websites with redirect. Brand protection
indicates that a website running on a homograph domain
name is redirected to the website running on the correspond-
ing original domain name. That is, the owner of the original
domain name has registered the homograph to protect their
brand. We found that while the majority of the redirected
domain names were attributed to either brand protection or
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Table 12: Classification of the active IDN homographs.
Category Numbers
Domain parking 348
For sale 345
Redirect 338
Normal 281
Empty 222
Error 113
Total 1,647
Table 13: Classification of the active IDN homographs.
Category Numbers
Brand protection 178
Legitimate website 125
Malicious website 35
Total 338
Table 14: Number of malicious IDN homographs.
Homoglyph DB hpHosts GSB Symantec
UC 28 2 1
SimChar 222 12 7
UC ∪ SimChar 242 13 8
legitimate websites, we found 35 of them were detected as
malicious websites.
6.3 Malicious IDN Homographs
To check whether the detected IDN homographs have been
used for malicious purposes, we leveraged three different
sources of blacklists, hpHosts [17], Google Safe Browsing
(GSB) [14], and Symantec DeepSight [33]; of the three lists,
hpHosts, which is a community-based database, had the
largest number of entries as we collected data spanning sev-
eral years. As GSB and Symantec DeepSight are databases
maintained by commercial companies, they provide lists
of malicious domains that have been inspected by security
experts with high confidence. We applied the blacklists to
3,280 of detected IDN homographs, which include non-active
domains. Table 14 lists the results. We note that the num-
bers shown in the table do not include ones shown in the
previous subsection; the previously found malicious web-
sites had redirected URLs. By incorporating SimChar into
the homoglyph DB, the number of detected malicious IDN
homographs increased.
6.4 Reverting to Original Domains
Although we begin with a reference domain name list to
search for IDN homographs, this approach may not detect
IDN homographs if a non-popular website is targeted. There-
fore, if we find a malicious domain name, which is composed
as an IDN, it is useful to be able to identify the original
domain name targeted by the IDN homograph attack. Oth-
erwise, we cannot trace the possible damage caused by the
attack. Thanks to the homoglyph database we developed,
we can revert to the possible original domain name by re-
placing a homoglyph with the corresponding Basic Latin
letter. We reverted the malicious IDNs to the original do-
main names and removed those were contained in the Alexa
top-1k domains. We ended up 91 of malicious IDNs whose
original domains were not contained in the Alexa list. This
observation indicates that there were non-negligible number
of malicious IDN that targeted non-popular websites. Our
approach can automatically revert such domains.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss the limitations of our work,
after which we consider effective countermeasures against
the threat of an IDN homograph attack.
7.1 Limitations
The primary contribution of this study was to build an auto-
mated framework that can detect a Unicode homoglyph and
an IDN homograph. Below we discuss several limitations of
the approaches we followed for evaluating our framework
as well as their future extensions.
Confusability Test In this work, we evaluated the confus-
ability of homoglyphs by a single character, i.e., participants
judged whether a potential homoglyph is confusable or dis-
tinct by viewing a pair of characters. However, as homo-
glyphs are generally abused in a word or even in a sentence,
we may also need to study the confusability of homoglyphs
by using words or sentences because this context may affect
the user’s perception. The context-aware evaluation of the
confusability of a homoglyph is left for future study.
Font Type In this work, we leveraged GNU Unifont, which
is a bitmap-based font. GNU Unifont is one of the widely
available Unicode glyphs with a wide range of coverage, but
many other Unicode fonts are available in the wild, e.g., Noto
font [13], which is a scalable font. As our framework is auto-
mated, it would be straightforward to extend our evaluation
to other font families. This would be a future task.
Measurement Target Our measurement study focused on
the world’s most popular TLD, .com, yet many other TLDs
are used in the wild. For instance, the blacklists we used
in this work contain 1,054 of domain names attributed to
the ‘рф’ TLD, which is the Cyrillic country code TLD for
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the Russian Federation. Studying such class of malicious
IDNs from the viewpoints visual deception is left for fu-
ture study. In addition, although current IDN homograph
attacks are mainly targeted at ASCII domains, IDNs that
contain non-ASCII characters are emerging. Such IDNs may
contain ideographs such as Hieroglyphs. Our approach can
cover homoglyphs consisting of any characters including the
ideographs. Studying these potential targets of homograph
attacks and their threats would also be a future topic.
7.2 Countermeasures against IDN
Homograph Attacks
As we have shown in Section 2, countermeasures against an
IDN homograph attack implemented in modern browsers
have the following drawbacks: if an IDN violates a rule of
permitted characters, the countermeasure forcibly represents
the IDN in the form of Punycode, which is not a user-friendly
expression. This countermeasure may not provide a user
with any indication of the context behind such transcoding.
Moreover, a countermeasure is not effective against non-IDN
homographs where homoglyphs reside in the same Unicode
block; i.e, the IDN conforms with the rule of permitted char-
acters.
To explicitly inform the user of the possibility of an IDN
homograph attack with a reasonable context would require
the user to be presented with the Unicode representation,
instead of forcibly converting the IDN to Punycode. To this
end, we could adopt a user interface (UI) that emphasizes the
difference between the original domain name and the poten-
tial IDN homograph. Figure 12 presents an image of such a
UI, which could be implemented with the aid of homoglyph
databases such as SimChar and UC.We note that sizes of Sim-
Char and UC are small enough to be embedded into a client
program such as Browser extension/plug-in.. This UI would
enable a user to understand which part of a domain name
is replaced by which character. This information would be
expected to play a vital role in informing the user about the
possible threat of a phishing attack caused by an IDN homo-
graph. More importantly, as an IDN is designed to provide a
user-friendly expression of a domain name by using native
languages, forcibly converting an IDN to Punycode would
significantly impair the user experience. We expect the adop-
tion of such an interface to improve users’ awareness of the
possible threats posed by an IDN homograph attack; i.e., they
would become more knowledgeable regarding the context of
the presented domain names and be more aware of possible
threats. Implementation and evaluation of such a method
could be the subject of further study.
WARNING
You are accessing g໐໐gle.com. 
Did you mean google.com?
໐ o
Use of homoglyph detected.
https://g໐໐gle.com/
Lao Digit Zero Latin Small Letter O
Go to google.comGo to g໐໐gle.com
Figure 12: Image of the UI presenting countermea-
sures against an IDN homograph attack based on the
homoglyph database.
7.3 Ethical Considerations
In Section 4, we performed human study to assess the human
perception on the detected homoglyphs. Before conducting
our human study experiments, we carefully followed the
checklist provided by our institutional IRB and concluded
that our experiments conformed with the principles of the
research ethics. The fact that our user study does not collect
any personally identifiable information nor privacy-sensitive
information also justifies our conclusion. We also cared the
amount of reward for the participants, considering the time
to complete a task and minimum wage.
8 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss related work in terms of IDN ho-
mograph detection methods and their measurement studies.
8.1 IDN Homograph Detection
Several studies have led to the proposal of methods to detect
IDN homographs. The approaches they followed are broadly
classified into two types: image-based and character-based.
Image-based IDN Homograph Detection As an IDN ho-
mograph exploits the visual similarity between characters, it
is natural to apply image-based analysis for detecting these
homographs. Liu et al. [21] generated images corresponding
to 1.4 million registered IDNs and reference domain names
extracted from the top 1,000 domain names listed on Alexa
Top Sites. They then detected 1,516 IDN homographs based
on the visual similarities between images. Furthermore, they
found an additional 42,671 IDNs that were visually similar to
the reference domain names but were still unregistered. Un-
fortunately, details of their detection methods and settings
are not provided in their paper. Sawabe et al. [30] devel-
oped a method to detect IDN homographs by leveraging
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optical character recognition (OCR). The method replaced
non-ASCII characters in IDNs with similar ASCII characters
using OCR-based image recognition and detected IDN ho-
mographs if the replaced IDNs corresponded with reference
domain names on Alexa Top Sites.
Character-based IDN Homograph Detection A few re-
searchers adopted the character-based approach. To the best
of our knowledge, only two previous studies [26, 37] at-
tempted to apply this approach. Quinkert et al. [26] searched
IDN homographs based on a list of homograph pairs, which
is equivalent to the homoglyph DB using UC in our study,
and detected 2,984 IDN homographs targeting 810 reference
domain names. Tian et al. [37] developed a detection method
based on UC to identify IDN homographs. As shown in Sec-
tion 4, our homoglyph DB, SimChar outperformed UC-based
detection in the sense that the homoglyphs of SimChar were
perceived to be more confusing than those of UC while main-
taining high coverage of homoglyphs; thus, our method com-
plements previous work to cover IDN homographs more
comprehensively.
8.2 Measurement Study of IDN
Homograph Attacks
Apart from the IDN homograph detection method described
above, several researchers have performed measurement
studies of IDN homograph attacks in the wild. In 2006, Hol-
gers et al. [15] conducted a passive measurement study on a
campus network to search for IDN homographs accessed by
users. They also used active DNS probing to detect registered
IDN homographs for a limited number of reference domains.
Tian et al. [37] studied domains created by various types
of domain squatting techniques including IDN homographs
to detect phishing websites that exploit homographs in the
wild. Le Pochat et al. [24] defined the concept of IDNs that
owners of brands with diacritical marks would like to use
and generated 15,276 such IDNs. They found that 43% of
them were available for registration in 2019. Chiba et al. [5]
performed a measurement study to demonstrate that there
are many IDN homograph attacks targeting non-English
brands or combining other domain squatting methods.
These previous studies mainly focused on the measure-
ment of IDN homographs. We believe our character-based
approach to comprehensively detect IDN homographs could
be readily applied to these studies, and thus could comple-
ment them to provide a more comprehensive understanding
of IDN homographs.
9 CONCLUSION
This work led to the development of a new framework named
ShamFinder, which is useful for detecting IDN homographs
efficiently. The key technical contribution of our work was
the construction of a new homoglyph database named Sim-
Char, which can be updatedwithout requiring time-consuming
manual efforts. As SimChar is portable, it can be implemented
in various systems/platforms as a key component of coun-
termeasures against the threat of IDN homograph attacks.
Noteworthy is that SimChar could be used for other promis-
ing security applications such as detecting obfuscated plagia-
rism, which exploits Unicode homoglyphs. We release the
code and data of ShamFinder [32]. Our future work includes
the extension of our study; i.e., extending the domain name
space to be explored, extending the font sets, studying the
confusability of non-ASCII homoglyphs, etc.
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